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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit, at the European University 
Institute, was created to further three main goals. First, to 
continue the development of the European University Institute as a 
forum for critical discussion of key items on the Community 
agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to 
scholars of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual 
research projects on topics of current interest to the European 
Communities. Both as in-depth background studies and as policy 
analyses in their own right, these projects should prove valuable 
to Community policy-making.
One of the continuing research interests of the Policy Unit 
is the ongoing process of institutional reform in the European 
Communities. Dr. Wessels' paper represents an effort to lay some 
theoretical foundations for the strategy to be folowed in the wake 
of the Dooge Report and the European Parliament's Draft Treaty on 
European Union.
Further information about the work of the European Policy 
























































































































































































Of Crocodiles, Sharks and Skunks: How to Reach the Holy Grail of
European Union
I. The Debate on Institutional Strategies
1. A neglected field of integration studies
2. Methodological fallacies - cliffs ahead in a stormy sea or how
to minimize the danger of falling in a methodological 
trap.
a) Three risks
Fallacies deriving from historical "lessons"
Traps of a feasibility approach
Problems of the "political necessity" approach
b) The plea for "educated guesses"
II. The European Union - A Vague and Ambiguous Aim
1. Of bits and pieces floating around
2. Four models of European Union





























































































a ) The actors at different stages
b) Procedures and legal mechanisms
c ) The modalities
2. Some types of strategies
IV. The Relative Importance of Integration Factors or: who is to
blame for successes and failures?
1. The role of different groups of actors
a) First theses
2. The dynamics of integration
a) The national environment: The withering away of original 
integration functions
b) The Community environment - restraints of a "cooperative 
federalism"
c) The international environment - unity by external 
coercion?





























































































Die Strategie entnimmt die zu untersuchenden Mittel und Zwecke nur 
aus der Erfahrung.
(Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, 19. Auflage, Bonn 1980, S.
294 )
"Tactics is fighting and strategy is planning where and how to 
fight" ("Strategy", in: International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences, 1967, Vol. 15, p. 281)
Die Politik bedeutet ein starkes langsames Bohren von harten 
Brettern mit Leidenschaft und Augenmass zugleich... Allé 
geschichtliche Erfahrung bestatigt, ... dass man das Mogliche 
nicht erreichte, wenn nicht immer wieder in der Welt nach dem 
Unmoglichen gegriffen worden ware, aber der, der das tun kann, 
muss ein Führer sein und nicht nur das, sondern... auch ein Held 
... Welche beides nicht sind, müssen sich wappnen mit jener 
Festigkeit des Herzens, die auch dem Scheitern aller Hoffnungen 
gewachsen ist, jetzt schon, sonst werden sie nicht im Stande sein, 
auch nur durchzusetzen, was moglich ist. Nur wer sicher ist, dass 




























































































gesehen, zu duiam odor zu gemein ist fur das, was er ihr bieten 
will..., nur der hat den "Beruf" zur Politik.





























































































Of Crocodiles, Sharks and Skunks:
How to reach the Holy Grail of European Union
To assess the utility and feasibility of various strategies 
for institutional reform of the European Communities is a risky 
business: the goal "European Union" is in a misty future and 
there are diverging and controversial interpretations of what the 
institutional set-up of a European Union (whatever this means) 
should look like. For the sake of simplicity, four institutional 
models are identified in this paper, of course with the 
reservation that a "simple" cost-benefit analysis of different 
strategies is not possible even with the aid of models.
The academic debate about how to reach the Grail is - 
compared with research on policy areas and institutions of the 
Communities - in a rather early and inconclusive stage. This 
paper suggests certain conceptual ingredients of "strategy" and 
identifies nine different strategies so far pursued or discussed; 
these approaches, however, are not clear-cut alternatives, but 
might be used simultaneously or in subsequent periods.
Methodological traps abound: in analysing the relative 




























































































lessons from unresearched history, with the risk of sticking to 
overly simple analogies, and to rely on political science analysis 
also known for the imperfect state of the art - with the danger 
of deterministic fallacies.
This paper presents some theses with preliminary conclusions 
on different strategies. The major argument: The crucial factor
for further steps towards reform will be the perception of a few 
national leaders that an overall package deal will serve their 
political goals - even against the resistance of the national 
welfare establishment. In a system of "cooperative federalism", 
where the major actors are involved with both national and 
European responsibilities, the political support for "radical" 
strategies (a "saut qualitatif" in terms of transferring
competences to a new European level) is small. Neither are 
challenges from the world outside Europe necessarily a mobilizing 
force.
Conclusions from this analysis are not encouraging. Major 
internal or external crises excluded, the most feasible strategy 
would be to build up a new core area, though the utility of a 
really new, different, more efficient and more democratic j
institutional set-up is at best open to debate and the cost - in 
terms of destroying the existing Community framework - high. The 




























































































hesitant to jump on a leaving train. Resignation about our 
distance from the Holy Grail, however, should not discourage 
political activities: perceptions and interest constellations can 
be subject to surprising changes. Academic analysis, though 
gloomy, cannot predict the future; but it might help politicians 
to evade some traps.
1. THE DEBATE ON INSTITUTIONAL STRATEGIES
1. A neglected field of integration studies
The academic and political debate on integration strategies - 
compared with the discussion on the institutional legal forms and 
policy areas of a Eure ;ean Union- was and is underdeveloped. 
Though it is generally accepted that initiatives for a "relance 
européenne" need to be pursued and implemented by some kind of 
political strategy, there are few academic works that assess the 
relative utility of different options. The various permutations 
of actors/forces (taking arid pursuing the initiative for reform) 
procedures (of preparing, pursuing and implementing projects) and 





























































































In the political debate, proposals for integration strategies 
quite often boil down to cliches, blaming the lack of "political 
will" or the present "intergovernmental " - as opposed to 
"supranational" - character of the Conununit ies, (2) and fall back 
on familiar recipes for reform, such as producing "pressure" 
through self-imposed obligations via art ificial/arbitrary 
timetables (e.g. the Werner plan, the EMS resolution 1978, the 
final clause of the Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart) or founding 
committees (Vedel, three wise men, Genscher/Colombo follow up, 
Spaak II) which generally serve as an alibi for postponing 
decisions and at the same time creating the image of "activity": 
"Paralysis by analysis" is an often employed tool.
A major problem for these debates on strategy is the lack of 
a commonly defined or generally accepted goal of European 
integration or its institutional structure. The concept of a 
European Union is kept vague on purpose; thus it is not possible 
to analyse a goal-instrument relationship in which the alternative 
ways to one specific, clearly set goal could be assessed with some 
form of academic cost/benefit analysis.(3) The selection among 
different strategies is thus directly linked to a specific 
interpretation of a European Union and its institutional 
characteristics. Academic research, therefore, must always 




























































































The debates in both academic and political circles have been 
intensified by the Genscher/Colombo, the Crocodile Club initiative 
and the Dooge Committee. Spinelli's (at least early) "radical" 
shift away from the government/bureaucracy complex as major actors 
to a "coalition" of parliaments induced a new wave of conceptual 
reflection about bits and pieces of strategies, many already 
floating around since the beginning of the integration process. 
The major part of this paper is devoted to revisiting basic 
assumptions of different strategies for institutional reforms. 
Theses on the integration process are based on the methodological 
assumption that an assessment of integration strategies cannot be 
limited to a narrow view on Community institutions as they work, 
but need to include the environment in which Community strategies 
have to operate.(4)
2. Methodological fallacies - cliffs ahead in a stormy sea or how 
to minimize the danger of falling in a methodological trap
a) Three risks
Reflections on integration strategies cannot be separated 
from their inherent methodological problems. Indeed, given the 
imperfect state of our art, some methodological assumptions must 
be made. Some faulty assumptions commonly confusing debate on 




























































































the fallacies of historical analogies, the unreflected use of 
earlier "lessons"; the deterministic fixation, as a consequence 
of overly rigid "feasibility approaches"; and voluntaristic 
activism, deriving from a "political necessity" approach.
Fallacies deriving from historical "lessons"
Successes like the Spaak Committee and failures like 
Spinelli's Congress of the European People are quite often 
transposed into the present : "What worked then will work 
again..." Or: Because the heads of government have always failed 
we need alternative strategies.
Taking up Hegel's view that history is always right, 
successes are given a higher "moral" weight than failures; thus, 
what has succeeded in the history of European integration becomes 
sacrosanct and petrifies into a doctrine. The Monnet or Spaak 
method of integration and strategies are thus sometimes turned - 
contrary to what those persons perhaps believed themselves - from 
a useful strategy for a certain political constellation into a 
general rule which is taken out of its historical context .
Historical processes and persons are turned into myths which 
are contrasted with the rather miserable reality of today. The 




























































































conference (which apparently was rather inconclusive (5)), and the 
Spaak Committee (see the Fontainebleau Communique) are invoked to 
put some kind of moral pressure on present-day politicians to act 
with the same courage and in the same direction. As long as these 
myths are used only to motivate politicians to act more forcefully 
for integration, they are not necessarily harmful; as soon as 
they become raster-plans or models from which a deviation is 
considered as a sin, however, they can block constructive 
policies.
Linked with the mystification of historical success as an 
incentive or as a master plan is the doctrinalization of once- 
accepted principles for institutional reforms, e.g. the formula of 
returning to the "original institutional equilibrium of the 
Treaties" or of retaining the national veto for "vital interests". 
Without analysing the conditions in which these principles were 
developed and their respective usefulness in different situations, 
the insistence on using them again becomes an obstacle to 
evaluating present actions and preparing those for the future. 
Even if it were proved that deviation from such a principle was 
dysfunctional at a given time in Community history, a return to 
the paradise of the past generation might be equally dysfunctional 
if paradise has meanwhile changed its character. Without an 




























































































in the past and comparing them with the present constellation, 
historical analogies can thus be misleading and dangerous.
Strategies for European Union in the second half of the 
eighties thus run the risk of relying on superficial assessments 
of strategies that were developed in the immediate post-war 
period. Myths also invite "revisionist" critics,(6) who destroy 
not only overrated success but tend to underestimate the influence 
of the once overestimated factors.(7)
Another trap historical lessons present for strategists is 
interpreting history only from the perspective of today's need, 
pointing at lost opportunities. For example, it is sometimes 
claimed that if we had only followed the Fouchet plan, even in its 
most intergovernmental form, we would be much better off today. 
But this view does not take into account the constellation of the 
time and might lead to a policy of using each possible step 
forwards without any assessment of different strategies open and 
disregarding the utility of fighting for a better solution than 
those which seem politically feasible.
Another methodological foible of current discussion on 
strategies is classification of historical periods of the 
Community in a way that seems obvious at first sight, but may not 




























































































different kinds of strategies to refer to a "Europe of the second 
generation" as long as you do not make clear for what purpose and 
along which lines you distinguish among "generations"? Using 
different events and categories, you could easily establish a 
classification with at least two, three, or four "generations" of 
Europeans.(8) Even with more sophistication it might be difficult 
to use these classifications, as different "generations" are 
working together in one ball game at the same time (e.g. from 
Spinelli to Fabius). Dahrendorf's classification of a First, 
Second and Third Europe (9) is more elaborate, but it has clear 
shortcomings in explaining present day-developments in which the 
policies of several periods intermingle or collide. Weiler (10) 
has pointed to the "parallelism" of intergovernmentalization in 
decision making with increasing supranationalism in decision 
implementation.(11)
Traps of a feasibility approach
The (useful and necessary) practice of analysing the present 
political constellation with reference to basic factors and 
structures (e.g. the perseverance of the "nation state" or the 
tensions of economic divergences) quite often leads explicitly or 





























































































As in other fields, "historical trends" are quite often 
extrapolated into the present and future and thus turn into rigid 
strait-jackets . For example, we witness over the past decades an 
increased involvement and weight of national governments and 
bureaucracies, leading some to assume implicitly that this 
intergovernmentalization is a "natural"(!) and "logical" (!) 
development, which can and should not be counteracted. Without 
looking at the basic factors of this trend, e.g. the welfare state 
dimension (see below) and analysing its persistence, such 
extrapolations of a "visible" flow of events in a certain 
direction leave us unprepared for possible underlying structural 
changes .
The future is then quite often equally "determined" by these 
factors, leaving no real space for political manoeuvres by 
political actors. Their activities can only hasten or slow down 
the inbuilt dynamics of an historical process. The inherent 
danger of certain feasibility studies is thus political 
resignation.
Again: This approach can lead us to base our strategies for 
building the European Union and its institutions on past rather 




























































































Problems of the "political necessity approach
The methodical trap of the political necessity approach is to 
start the debate on strategies by analysing the shortcomings of 
the present world we live in. Thereupon, a European program 
leading us to the Holy Grail is sketched.(12) Implementation is 
then left to politicians, who are supposed to reach these goals by 
mobilizing the "political will" which is supposed to flow 
naturally from the fact that the program reflects the most 
rational way to solve the problems ahead and will thus be 
supported by all men of "good will". Consequently, the path to 
this paradise can be paved e.g. by clear landmarks or binding 
timetables. Only a political leader is needed to convince 
citizens of the usefulness of the program. On the whole, it is a 
technocratic approach dependent on intellectual insight and 
expertise - Plato's philosopher king reborn for European 
integration. This approach leads to political activism based on 
an intellectual analysis of what needs to be done, without 
analysing the constraints of a pluralistic, conflict-ridden 
society.
b) The plea for "educated guesses"
The risks of such methodological fallacies are often seen and 




























































































strategies runs too often into such traps, reducing the ability of 
theory to guide policy. Given these risks, should we refrain from 
all use of history and systematic analysis developing instead 
"pragmatic'1 concepts which better fit present-day realities and 
avoid the political and intellectual deviations caused by 
historical doctrines, oversimplified extrapolations or utopian 
timetables? There are several problems with this quite often 
preached pragmatism.
Political decision-makers as well as academic observers draw 
explicitly (as noted above) or even more often implicitly from 
their personal experiences or at least from their personal 
interpretation of Community history. "Pragmatism" then, quite 
often means unreflected conclusions from limited experiences and a 
distorted set of facts consolidated into an "ideology" about what 
should be done and how it should be done. As Keynes pointed out, 
those who claim to be pragmatic base their actions on "outmoded 
theories". History is part of political life. What we need is 
not to exclude it (which in any case is impossible) but to exploit 
it more thoroughly for our strategies. Reflection, thus, should 
serve as a "mind opener".
An exploitation of history should be based on sound social 
science methods. From Popper, we know that a verification of 




























































































falsifications, however, are highly useful to refute theses and 
theories not sufficiently explaining reality. From academic 
research, we know how difficult it is to identify relevant 
variables (factors) and, in particular, to isolate them from 
additional factors; the "cetris paribus clause" is difficult to 
keep,(13) so we always run the risk of overestimating the 
influence of one factor (e.g. the personality of decision makers 
or the perennial national interests) and of underestimating other 
factors, like the compatibility of economic and political 
structures (or vice versa). At the same time, inclusion of all 
possible and potential factors in the debate on strategies is 
practically impossible and/or too costly in terms of time, money 
and energy.
For the debate on strategies, we should therefore highlight 
the possible impact of certain factors. In this vein, I propose 
to define a series of theses, or hypotheses, that will help define 
the limits of realistic integration strategies. In more extended 
research, these theses could be tested in case studies. In this 
paper, the theses should just serve to stimulate discussions. 
Debate will not and cannot find the one and only "truth" about how 
and why strategies for progressing towards European Union fail or 
succeed, but hopefully we can point out some oversimplifications 
and work out "probabilities". We can aim at least for "educated 




























































































Factors helping to understand certain successful or 
unsuccessful approaches to European Union can then be identified 
as crucial elements for strategies to pursue. Thus, if we find 
out that package deals among member governments are the most 
crucial factors for steps ahead (see below), then we would 
recommend not spending time only on identifying the best 
integration steps with the interest of member governments. 
Second-best options in terms of a purely technical solution should 
then be considered as political optima solutions presently outside 
the area of compromise among the crucial actors' political 
interests. This paper thus starts from the methodological 
approach that "feasibility" (political potential and constraints) 
and "goal-achievement" are two criteria which need to be examined 
for developing strategy.
In accepting both criteria, it would be a mistake to first 
describe the ideal world, the paradise, and only then try to find 
ways to achieve it. Quite often, the train then is already on a 
completely wrong track, from which it cannot be moved. Right from 
the beginning, both the feasibility and the goal achievement 
aspect must be discussed together.
By using this methodological device, it is assumed that 
within a set-up of historical and economic factors political 




























































































II. THE EUROPEAN UNION - A VAGUE AMD AMBIGUOUS AIM 
1. Of bits and pieces floating around
The term "European Union" is - for political reasons - 
deliberately kept vague.(15) Like the term "integration", it 
bears different meanings for different political forces.(16) The 
work "Union" itself refers to various concepts in different 
languages.(17) The "unionist" forces in early integration history 
were strong defenders of intergovernmental cooperation, stressing 
national sovereignty against federalists demanding transfer of 
sovereignt ies.(18)
In Community history itself, the term "European Union" is 
only one among several for "more efficient and democratic European 
institutions", for achieving more "unity", more "common" policies, 
a new "federal" constitution, etc. The Rome Treaty refers in its 
preamble to an "ever closer union among European peoples"; the 
Fouchet discussions turned around a "political Union". The Paris 
Communiqué of 1972 is more comprehensive but likewise does not 
define a clear goal. The formula "converting, ... in absolute 
conformity with the signed Treaties, all the relationships between 
Member States into a European Union" is vague about the 
institutional forms and policy contents of the new entity and even 




























































































men stressed essential principles (like solidarity), new tasks and 
detailed institutional and procedural proposals. The European 
Council "welcomed" those reports by underlining at the same time 
different lines of further work (like "consolidating" and 
"developing" the "acquis communautaire" on one hand and "best use" 
of possibilities for cooperation methods on the other hand).(19) 
The European Council's latest attempt to define the European 
Union, in the Solemn Declaration, and by the EP, in the draft 
treaty on the European Union, show few signs of a significant 
convergence on the meaning of European Union and its institutional 
set-up, though certain extremes on the federal as well as the 
intergovernmental side were excluded.
For a debate on strategies, this ambiguity reduces the 
"value-free" or "neutral" character of the advice academics can 
give. The definition of the goal is already part of the strategy 
and must therefore take "strategical" considerations into account.
2. Four models as possible institutional goals of a European Union
Though we do not dispose of one specific politically 
legitimized and/or generally agreed-upon definition of an 
institutional set-up which could serve as our goal, four models 




























































































(1) In a "presidency" model, the European Council disposes of the
"supreme power", acting above and outside the Community 
system. The intergovernmental character might be reinforced 
by a political secretariat for the heads of government, 
reducing the role of the Commission and the Council
Secretariat. The Council, in practice, would turn into a 
high-level Coreper, guaranteeing at least the legality of 
actions. The European Parliament might have a teaching
function with some kind of moral authority. Here European 
Union follows the concept of a "1*Europe des Patries".
(2) In the "reinforced Community" model, the relations between 
existing Community bodies are made more efficient:
* the European Council turns de jure into the Council on the 
level of the heads of government;
* the Council decides by majority voting;
* the Commission exercises its initiative and implementation 
function more forcefully, its position being reinforced by 
majority voting in the Council;
* the European Parliament increases its power of control (with 





























































































This European Union concept returns to the "original" 
equilibrium of the Treaty.
(3) The "dual" model is characterized by the co-decision-making
power of the Council and Parliament of the Union, both of 
which have to agree - with different forms of majority - to 
legislative and budgetary acts, to treaties and to the 
composition of the Commission. The institutional concept of 
this dual model is based on two legitimacies: the national
one and a direct European one.
(4) The "parliamentary federation" set-up is characterized by the
supremacy of the European Parliament, which elects the
government and has the final say in legislative and budgetary 
acts. The Council becomes a second chamber with some more 
rights in special "domaines" réservés" like foreign affairs.
The institutional models of the European Union do not 
necessarily determine the strategy with which the respective set­
up is to be achieved, i.e. one concept might be pursued with 
different strategies; or one strategy might serve different 
models. Nevertheless, we could expect to find a certain 
correlation between the institutions which are to play a principal 
role in the final set-up on one hand and the actors who are the 




























































































as some models - at least the dual and the federal - would need 
legal implementation in the form of a treaty or a constitution, 
the "strategical requirements" are by far higher: For a "saut
qualitatif" the strategy must be capable of inducing more radical 
change than in the case of progress "à petits pas".
III. STRATEGIES FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM - AN ATTEMPT AT 
CLASSIFICATION
1. Conceptual ingredients
Besides the ambiguity and diverging interpretations of the 
goal, the vagueness of what is called "strategy" contributes to 
the difficulties in the academic and political debate. Quite 
often strategy is used synonymously for "program", "policies" or 
"goals". For our purpose, it is useful to identity the following 
elements as essential parts of the concept of "strategy". •
a) The actors in different stages
* Who is pushing for an initiative? A respectable personality 
like Monnet; a group of influential advisers; an "élite" 
group like the European Movement; the representatives of the 





























































































* Who is the "catalyst1 needed to make a decision on the
procedure for a serious follow-up? The heads of government in 
the European Council; national parliaments?
* Who are the political actors/forces who are the object of the 
initiative, i.e. who are supposed to legitimize and implement 
the decisions? National governments in the European Council, 
national parliaments, or Community institutions?
* Who are the actors who need to be engaged for political
support? Parties, pressure groups, national parliamentarians?
b) Procedures and legal mechanisms
* What kind of procedures are used for taking the initiative?
Informal, even secretive channels or formal, open treaty
provisions (Art. 236)?
* What kind of legal/procedural form is aimed at as a result of 
the initiative? Declarations that are not legally binding, 






























































































* What is the content of the initiative? Is it of a broad 
overall nature including both several sectors of activities and 
an overall institutional change (e.g. the draft treaty for a 
European Political Community, Draft Treaty of the European 
Parliament), does it enumerate several areas of activity 
without any specific institutional changes, like the Werner 
report and the Paris 1972 summit; does it concentrate on a few 
policy sectors like coal and steel, monetary integration or on 
a few key institutional sectors like the European Council, or 
European Political Cooperation? Does the initiative thus 
stress institutional reforms or concrete problem solving?
* How detailed is the initiative? Is it a carefully drafted and 
detailed document (like the Draft Treaty on European Union); 
more a general statement of major points leaving details open 
(e.g. the 1972 summit), or the outline of a few central topics 
to which others can be added (like the Monnet plan or the 
Giscard/Schmidt initiative on the EMS)?
* How carefully are the explanations drafted and presented to 
different forces - just a reference to the gloomy situation of 
Europe as raisonnement or more explicitly in terms of the 





























































































* From what kind of "dynamic mechanisms" is the strategy supposed 
to draw its strength, e.g. inbuilt economic rationales of large 
markets, the economic self-interest of involved circles of the 
society, package deals among interests of different 
countries/nations, the democratic will of the European people, 
or external threats?
A debate on this kind of an integration strategy needs to be 
based on some kind of "positive theory" explaining why and how the 
process of integration develops. Thus the validity of different 
integration theories plays a crucial role for the success of an 
integration strategy. The lamentable situation of general 
integration theories (21) increases the problems of recommending a 
successful strategy.
2. Some types of strategies
The enumerated elements of strategies can be mixed in 
numerous combinations. Judging, however, from attempts so far and 
from the academic and political debate, our considerations should 
concentrate on several types of strategies:
(1) The "statesmen" strategy stresses the role of the political 
leader,(22) who needs to be convinced in informal, secretive, 




























































































the personal characteristics and political style of the 
leading personalities. The character of the final product 
should be non-binding or - at least - the national parliaments 
should enter the scene only at the end. The probability is 
high that this strategy will mainly be used for a presidency 
model of a European Union. The process should also exclude as 
far as possible "interdependent outsiders" like the 
Commission, the EP, etc.; if this is not possible, they 
should be allowed to play only a secondary role as "experts". 
The "political will" of the real "European statesman" emerges 
as the basic dynamic of this strategy.
(2) In the "conference" strategy (23), national governments 
follow formal procedures either according to Art. 236 of the 
Rome treaty or by intergovernmental conferences aside from 
treaty provisions. Community bodies would be officially 
consulted about a first version of the text. • Expert 
committees and national bureacracies play an emminent role. 
The final product consists of a treaty to be ratified by 
national parliaments. Such a strategy should mainly achieve 
basic changes towards a dual or federal model. The inherent 
"dynamics" are the constitutional procedures involving all 





























































































(3) The "coalition of parliaments" strategy identifies the 
parliaments as major actors, with the European parliament in 
the conceptual and political lead.(24) As the dynamics of the 
strategy turn on democratic/parliamentary "revolt" against the 
bureaucratic network, procedures are to be based on 
parliamentarians besides the usual and formal negotiation 
machinery of governments. The final product will be a treaty 
reinforcing the role of the EP in a dual or federal model of a 
European Union.
(4) The "revolutionary" strategy (25) sees all "existing"
political actors (also parties and national parliaments) as 
defending their own status quo within the existing political 
system; this strategy looks for a mobilization of the "mass" 
by an "avant-garde" leading to a European "constituante" 
really representative of the European people. The final
product will be a federal constitution.
(5) In a "directoire" strategy,(26) only the statemen of major (= 
larger = more powerful) countries agree on steps forward 
because only they feel "historical responsibilities" in a 
worldwide context and can develop the energy (lacking in other 
governments) for taking bold decisions. The major decisions 
will be taken in personal summits of those heads of 




























































































which are confronted with "submission" to the agreement by the 
"principal nations"(27) or exclusion from the "inner circle". 
The final product will probably give the leaders of the major 
countries a dominant role.(28)
(6) A "core area" strategy (29) propagates more integration for
all those countries prepared to join - the assumption is that 
this circle will consist of the original member countries (= 
core area). The others will either follow the lead into a
more integrated system or exclude themselves. The dynamic is 
based on the higher degree of shared interests and of common 
integration goals among those countries. The final
institutional product is open to debate, as this concept is 
proposed by actors with different institutional concepts 
ranging from a bi- or multilateral presidency model 
(Weidenfeld) to a dual model of six countries (Draft Treaty of 
the EP).
(7) The multi-tier or "abgestufte" integration strategy (30) tries
to combine a flexible implementation of generally (=
unanimously) agreed policies by some countries with stability 
in the overall institutional framework and help for those 
countries which have difficulties in following the others' 





























































































(8) The "problem solving" or "scope enlargment first" strategy 
downplays the importance of institutional reforms. Some 
members of this school esteem the present formal decision­
making decision-implementation structure as generally 
sufficient for solving the problems ahead of Europe,(31) some 
want to exclude the more controversial institutional issues 
from the agenda, as they might be a nuisance for concrete 
problem solving; some hope that broadening the scope of 
activities treated by the Community will finally induce, as 
"spill over",(32) an institutional reform. In all three 
variations of this school it is assumed that problem solving 
irrespective of the institutional structure is the major drive 
for more integration. Institutional reforms are at best a by­
product if not even a tactical nuisance. The flexibility of 
procedures within the established framework is given highest 
priority. The product in institutional terms is the status 
quo, with adaptations and additions.
(9) The "l'Europe a la carte" strategy,(33) stresses the priority 
of problem solving irrespective of detrimental institutional 
consequences for the existing Community.(34) Institutional 
engineering is at best the task at the end of a period free of 




























































































These strategies are not mutually exclusive; most of them 
are even quite often pursued at the same time or at least 
consecutively in a trial and error process. However, strategies 
cannot be switched arbitrarily. According to the relative utility 
of different ingredients, initiatives must be planned, priorities 
set regarding which actors to address and which procedures to 
employ, and coherence established between dynamic forces and 
procedures and actors.
IV. THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF INTEGRATION FACTORS OR: WHO IS TO
BLAME FOR SUCCESSES AND FAILURES?
1. The role of different groups of actors
Progress towards more institutional integration has so far come as 
parts of package deals among national interests as perceived by 
the political leadership in power, mainly heads of governments. 
These leaders were strong enough to sway opponents or overcome 
national political obstacles.(35) Or, to state the argument the 
other way round with Spinelli: initiatives failed because the
national governments (in the last decade: the European Council)




























































































This thesis needs some explanation:
a) Steps towards a European Union did not follow a master-plan 
conceived from an "idealistic" European point of view 
requiring "only" technical and legal implementation. Rather, 
piecemeal engineering with at most medium-term perspectives 
dominated. Schneider pointed out the concrete political 
interests dominating in the fifties. (36) Milward even states 
that his findings about the period up to 1951 "flatly 
contradict" the prominent role of European "idealism" based on 
war-time experiences (37) as they are elaborated by the work 
of Lipgens.(38)
There is also no inherent, historical deterministic force 
moving European society into a European federation; "the 
process of integrations is (not a) thread woven into the 
fabric of Europe's political destiny".(39)
Furthermore, functional necessities furnish no means for 
automatic implementation or at least no push strong enough to 
solve problems across national frontiers.
Successes in integration attempts are thus not caused by the 
absence of national interests and/or the orientation of 
political actors towards an optimal European model,(40) but by 




























































































b) Institutional reforms were parts of an overall package in 
which the scope-widening to deal with certain concrete 
problems was the engine to set the train in motion. Pure 
institutional engineering did not attract strong support.
On the other hand, progress towards European Union was not 
based on a "pure" package deal among "national" interests at a 
given moment. For lasting progress, structures, procedures 
and forms had to be included which out-lasted the original 
package. Scope enlargement as such is not sufficient 
to guarantee success.
Necessary conditions for a lasting success were thus twofold: 
satisfaction of political needs for the political top and the 
creation of lasting structures and procedures.
The institutional structures themselves were also quite often 
the result of compromises or package deals, but they had an 
inbuilt potential to start a process that would go beyond the 
original package deal.
It was Monnet's chef d'oeuvre to combine exactly those two 
elements in his CSCE plan. Indeed, the mastery of his plan is 
that it can be perceived both as a master plan for European 





























































































The structures which were created did not replace the nation 
state as the major political agency with a new European system 
run by independent bodies; the decisions on institutions 
established rules and procedures for accommodation or co­
existence of different, even diverging, national economic 
policies inside and outside the groups. Form and character of 
the "institutionalization of interdependence"(42) is a major 
factor deciding the failure or success of initiatives (see 
also Thesis 17 and 20).
c) "National interests" are not "fixed", dictated by history and 
geography. To a large degree, the perception of national 
leaders about the policies in one sector and in the overall 
framework defines the national interest in a given moment.(43) 
These perceptions of national interests are not necessarily 
based on a "narrow self-interest",(44) but might also derive 
from some enlightened self-interest disregarding tangible 
short-term costs for the sake of more, although less certain, 
medium-term benefits.
The perception of national interests was not only a function 
of actual political needs but also of the "vision" of 
political leaders (coming from a national environment) about 
the role which their respective countries should play in 




























































































heads of governments it is necessary to analyse in which 
medium-term direction they want to move their country in the 
light of alternatives open to them. How far costly
compromises are accepted for the sake of establishing a 
reliable framework depends on that vision of the future.
The more Community policy is reduced to a management of the 
status quo (45) instead of creating potential future benefit, 
however, the more the short-term view of "national interests" 
dominates. If you cannot sell a compromise as "good for the 
future of your children", then you are induced or even forced 
to control the concrete distribution of costs and benefits of 
a package deal.
This thesis also implies that the perception of national 
interests by political leaders in steps towards European Union 
does not necessarily derive from "good" or "bad" attitudes 
toward integration on the part of the responsible heads of 
government, but on how European strategies serve different 
policy goals at the same time:
- to maintain or strengthen internal power by winning general 
points vis-à-vis the electorate through selling specific 
policies with a European label (only possible in those 




























































































integration (see thesis 3) and by putting internal
opposition forces in a difficult position;
foreign-policy goals like achieving some kind of equal 
status (for the FRG in the Monnet plan, for Ireland in the 
EMS, etc.) or gaining or reserving a large status in 
international affairs (as for the FRG and the UK in the 
creation of EPC (46));
supporting internal and external economic policies (as for 
France in the Monnet plan (47));
establishing a historical reputation as a "European 
statesman". Thus, referring to the perception of national 
leaders does not imply that the achievement of progress was 
necessarily conditioned by having only "good Europeans" at 
the top of each national government. Strong pro-integration 
attitudes were not a necessary prerequisite for success. 
Again: Decisive was the overall political concept and the
assessment of ways to gain points in an internal power 
struggle. If progress in Europe becomes instrumental to the 
political strategies of several leaders at the same time, 
then preconditions are good. Thus, certain "integration 
cycles" can be discerned which are caused by political 
cycles in member countries.
In this context, the formula of the "political will" is 




























































































without a more profound analysis. The formula of the 
"political will" develops quite often into an empty category 
which - when present - is seen as a deus ex machina 
favouring initiatives, and - when absent - explains "easily" 
the ]ack of progress. Thus, recourse to "political will" 
becomes a truism which quite often prevents a closer look at 
reality. It is necessary to research the nature of a
political constellation which might explain why "political 
will" is present or absent and in which direction it will 
work.
d) The perception of national leaders is vital, a necessary but 
not sufficient precondition for success. The political 
leaders must also be able to implement the ideas and sell 
compromises in the national setting. Steps forward were 
always accompanied by battles in the national arena about the 
usefulness of the Community for a given interest. The "power" 
of leaders is of high importance. Thus, it is not sufficient 
to analyze only the perception of political leaders but the 
national political context, the power relationships among 
political and societal forces.(48) The political leadership 
is part of a political system in and through which the head of 
government has to operate. Especially for institutional 
reforms, strong resistance must be included in the analysis. 




























































































decision-making process - the battle in the capitals (49) - 
with the head of governments in a pivotal though not 
necessarily dominant position when European initiatives are 
the object of negotiations.
e) This concentration on the role of political leadership does 
not imply that major statesmen have to create and initiate all 
plans and initiatives by themselves; these might and quite 
often are prepared by the bureaucracy,(50) by single 
personalities like Monnet, or by groups of experts. It is 
perhaps quite indicative for this thesis that plans might 
"float" around for some time before being picked up by a 
political leadership that perceives them as useful in a given 
moment. In the seventies and eighties, however, compared with 
the early fifties, the political leadership needs to be 
involved more extensively.
If this thesis is valid, the strategies stressing the role of 
the "statesman" look more promising than e.g. the 
parliamentary coalition strategy - though we should be careful 
not to rely on the naive versions of "political will". The 
conference approach can then only be a complementary part of 
an overall strategy. The institutional out-come will be more 
likely to be a presidency or a reinforced Community model than 




























































































A necessary but not sufficient precondition for a successful 
package in the Community deal has been a French/Gerinan agreement 
on the major ingredients of the package.
This thesis implies or is based on following assumptions and 
lessons:
a) An initiative by one of those countries without an early 
understanding with the partner country did not work (see the 
Erhard Initiative from 1964, see Genscher/Colombo Initiative, 
see the French memoranda on the "espace social et industriel).
b) A common French/German initiative proved quite often successful 
in the Community because the positions of the other countries 
were in the middle ground between those of France and Germany. 
Thus a French/German agreement would not be detrimental to the 
interests of the "rest" of the Community.
c) The rest of the original members recognized the crucial 
importance of a French/German understanding. Though perhaps 
complaining about a certain style of policy-making, they did 
not object to a special relationship. Furthermore, the 
initiatives of those tv/o countries normally were brought into




























































































the Community framework at an early stage. The inherent 
tendency towards a bilateral hegemony or directoire was 
counterbalanced by an appropriate use of Community channels.
d) Other countries could veto the French/German package, but not 
substitute it. Thus, they have the blocking power to prevent 
French/German plans but the impact of initiatives of their own 
is significantly smaller than a French/German understanding. 
The entry of new countries like the U.K. increased the 
frequency and strength of vetos but did not lead to new 
constellations of dynamic driving forces.
e) There was and there is not necessarily a close identity or 
growing covergence of interests between France and the Federal 
Republic. Achieving consensus between Germany and France has 
always been difficult. Failure of quite a lot of initiatives 
can be explained more by French/German désaccord than by the 
"nuisance" power of other members. Though differences about 
policy contents and institutional forms were frequent among 
the two, at the end of the bargaining battle, there was often 
a specific drive by both of them to make a compromise for the 
sake of a stable Community, which was perceived by all post­
war leaders of both countries as a "vital" interest. This 
basic attitude vis-à-vis the system as such has not been 




























































































f) Of major importance for progress is therefore that the 
"political cycles" of the two national leaders coincide in 
terms of political strength and motivations. The results of 
The Hague 1969, Paris 1972 and 1974, Brussels 1978 and Milan 
1985 (?) indicate that the success rate for Community
strategies are following a "business" cycle mainly determined 
by the power of those two leaders.
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As a driving force the will of the European people has been of 
secondary importance.(51)
******************************************************************
No initiative was successful because the "people" forced 
their leaders to pursue certain pro-integration initiatives. 
Those initiatives which relied too much on "la volonté generale" 
as an instrument "against" governments failed. This- thesis 
assumes :
a) Citizens' general pro-European attitude is not unimportant. 
It may serve as a "permissive consensus"(52) which gives 
political leaders a certain freedom to manoeuvre, making it 
difficult for opposition forces to attack them. A general 
pro-European attitude is a positive factor if and when leaders 




























































































"statesman of historical and European rank". Thus, if this 
pro-European attitude in a country is non-existent or waning 
the statesman's room to manoeuvre and incentive to take and 
support initiatives are reduced, as they no longer form part 
of an overall political strategy in the internal power 
struggle (see Thesis 1).
b) Positive results of opinion polls like the Eurobarometer 
should not be ignored: the potent ial for stronger European
actions can be discerned,(53) but if those actions are not 
taken, no government leader will fall. Looking at studies 
about how voters decide about the party of their preference in 
elections, European initiatives seldom played a decisive role. 
Institutional technicalities especially do not arouse a 
popular reaction, as the dominant issues of the last election 
campaign for the European Parliament (1984) have demonstrated 
again. This implies that European initiatives were- not 
crucial for political survival, maintenance of political power 
or winning political power.
If this thesis is valid, appeals to the "people" will be 





























































































Political parties inside and outside Parliaments have played no 
major role in driving their leaders to strong actions, especially 
not in the field of institutional reform, not even since the 
cooperation of parties in the European-wide party groupings has 
intensified.
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a) One reason might be that winning elections is the crucial
function of all parties: As elections were not decided on the
ground of taking or leaving European initiatives (see Thesis 
3), parties did not "fight" for a European programme. This 
argument does not exclude that parties were concerned with
European questions, but they perceived them in "normal" times
as of limited utility for winning elections. Catch-all 
parties do not like to be on the negative side of a wide­
spread attitude on any issue; thus they preferred in most 
member countries to pronounce themselves as pro-European 
without making this a basic, crucial issue of e.g. the party 
leadership and programme.
b) A second more speculative reason for a certain passivity of 
major parties refers to a perhaps instinctive drive of parties 
to conserve power in their hands. Initiatives to transfer




























































































reduction of their own influence - irrespective of European 
party groupings in or outside the European Parliament.
From both arguments, the inconsistency between general pro­
European declarations on one side and reluctance to undertake
concrete actions on the other side can be explained. The pro­
European statements appeal to a broader public - the hesitance to
make specific commitments reflects a self-protect ion of 
competences typical of political organizations.
If this thesis is valid, the parliamentary coalition strategy 
will lack a crucial part of its dynamic. Expectations that 
Europe-wide party "federations" will provide a major impetus for 
integration may need to be drastically reduced.
★********************************5********************************
National parliaments on their own have so far played no major role 
beyond activities of the party groups inside the Parliaments.
Non-partisan initiatives, e.g. for the direct election of the
European Parliament, were of limited value. Reasons might be:
a ) The often-quoted loss of competences of national parliaments




























































































and bureaucracies. Rare outcries about insufficient 
information and participation (55) are muted (except in 
Denmark) by the "normal" interplay between the (majority) 
party(/ies) within the government and quite often by informal 
consultation procedures with national administrations.
b) Like parties, parliaments might be reluctant to give up 
powers, even if these exist only "on paper", to some other 
body, even if this is democratically elected.
Thus, the assumption of the parliamentary strategy that there 
is a natural "alliance" of parliaments against national 
governments and bureaucracies seems less valid than the thesis 
that national parliamentarians might prefer the existing - 
albeit perhaps mainly informal - influence on at least their 
government (which they can vote out of office) and their 
bureaucracy (to which they have direct access) to a perhaps 
formally more democratic control of Community policies by a 
European Parliament where their influence is comparatively 
marginal. A "dual" or even a "parliamentary federation" model 
is thus not a logical consequence of national parliaments' 
reaction to their loss of competences.
Interest groups (including trade unions) so far have concentrated




























































































general pro- and anti-European attitude is - like public opinion - 
of limited help or hindrance to initiatives for the institutional 
reform of a European Union.
★ ★★★★★**★*■**★*★*★★*★★***★★★*★★**★•*★******★★*★★***★★★★★*★*★★*★*****
Again, as with parties: hopes for a dynamic role of 
political, social and economic groups (the "forces vivantes") 
should be buried, if this thesis is valid.
National bureaucracies do not show a persistent pattern. Though 
they tend to conserve power in their own hands and to distrust 
initiatives, bureaucracies in most member countries contained pro­
integration coalitions, perhaps not majority, coalitions but of 
considerable strength. (56)
The often quoted position that "national bureaucracies, 
although they have to take their place as major political actors 
in the process and were indeed much more important to it than 
theory suggests, are deplorably ill-equipped for such a task (of 
long term calculations about gains and losses) trained as they are 
to distill with the greatest possible accuracy forecasts about 
calculable short-term consequences"(57) does not seem to be 




























































































initiatives, there were in most member countries also battles 
within national bureaucracies which were sometimes won by those 
who perceived Community progress as a positive factor.
Furthermore, political leadership could - if it wanted to - 
constrain bureaucracies to implement its plans. Thus, 
bureaucracies as such are not necessarily the foes of any 
integration strategies. However, a strategy which is clearly 
directed against any bureaucracy might be confronted with strong 
opposition. It is therefore necessary for dynamic strategies to 
look for supporting forces also within bureaucracies.
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The European leadership (High Authority, Commission, European 
Parliament) was instrumental in raising topics, including enduring 
procedural elements in the package deals, and providing new ideas. 
However, their part in getting an initiative off the ground and in 
implementing it were limited (see the Jenkins initiative for the 
EMS, the Thorn contribution to the Stuttgart and the Fontainebleau 
package).
Thus, if follows that the power of reforming the 





























































































Independent personalities (like Monnet or presidents of the 
European Movement) could play a vital part in inducing heads of 
government to take up an initiative and to suggest - out of their 
insights and personal contacts - constructive package deals. 
Unless, however, they are really close to the heads of government, 
their influence is marginal. Due to the increasing bilateral and 
multilateral tête-à-tête of politics the utility of such a role 
has decreased.
From this thesis it follows that new attempts to emulate 
Monnet's Action Committee are - compared with the original attempt 
- of clearly reduced utility.
We should be careful not to compartementalize political 
actors too much into single groups of actors, e.g. parties; we 
must be aware that there are "clusters" or networks of actors of 
different groups(59): Those clusters of, e.g., certain political 
leaders, parliamentarians, parties (or wings of parties), interest 
groups and civil servants are of considerable importance and 





























































































If we assume for a moment that Theses 1-9 are a valid 
starting point we can deduce additional theses concerning
strategic modalities and procedures which - at least at first 
glance - do not seem to be contradicted by past experiences.
2. Modalities - how to drag political leadership into the battle
Successful initiatives for European Union should at their 
inception clearly indicate the major aims without fixing the 
details too early.
The central package deal behind the initiatives should be 
clear to the national political leadership, but the programme 
should leave enough field for manoeuvre and supplementary ideas. 
It has proved vital that a locomotive of interest be put on the 
rails. Thus, the Draft Treaty of the EP might already be too 
fully developed and too complex in details.
In the next phase, that of concertât ion, it proved to be necessary 
that the political leadership make a strong commitment , not 





























































































* being involved directly in the crucial points;
* entrusting personal representatives who are really in close 
contact with political leadership drawing up detailed plans,
* giving the responsible bureaucratic institutions some freedom 
to manoeuvre with clear political aims.
Successes have been based on an intensive interplay of 
political leadership and the administrative apparatus. If one 
part is lacking, failure is rather likely.
Generally not successful, at least in phases after an 
initiative had been taken, were attempts to install high-level 
independent expert groups or wise men. Their intellectual 
capacity as such is not sufficient to generate a driving force for 
integrat ion.
In the finalization of the written agreement, intensive 
involvement of the political leadership in the central details is 
indispensable.
"Technical" details cannot only be left to the "experts" 




























































































differences are reflected. The common distinction between 
political decision "in principle" and the "technical" 
implementation by civil servants has proved to be quite often 
artificial and to increase only the problems of finalization.
********************************13********************************
For ratification or implementation again the political leadership
needed to get involved in lobbying in the national arena. No 
initiative worked as such.
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Agreements not requiring ratification are preferable because they 
involve less engagement of the political leadership inside their 
countries.
★ ★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★iff* 
The sensibility at home is less high and the political costs 
are lower when national leaders do not need to sell their product. 
At the same time, when the obligations stemming from legal 
agreements are higher, the control of follow-up by the national 




























































































Ambiguity in the texts can be helpful in arguing the case to 
different circles.
★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★*★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★
★ * * * ★ * * ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ * ★ ★ * ★ ★ ★ * * * ★ ★ ★ * ★ ★ ★ 15* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
The controversy about the "liberal" (used as an argument in 
the ratification in Bonn), and the "social" character of the Rome 
treaties (used as an argument in the Assemblée Nationale), for 
example, helped the Treaty pass, but such ambiguities can create 
controversy later on (which might still be preferable to having no 
steps forward at all). Water-proof drafting with no ambiguities 
quite often means standstill. It is necessary, however, to 
include procedures (legal or otherwise) for resolving disputes 
over different interpretations.
3. The dynamics of integration
a) The national environment: The withering away of original
integration functions
Theses 1-15 try to draw lessons from previous attempts to 
achieve institutional progress - thus, they can run the risk of 
falling into the trap of historical analogies. The following 
theses try to explain the observed behavioural patterns of 




























































































which the actors operate; these, therefore, are subject to the 
possible traps of the feasibility approach.
Major original functions of the integration process for Member 
States have been either fulfilled or have lost in importance. New 
functions are highly important but do not necessarily lead to 
institutional reforms.
In the post-war period the six original EC members used 
"integration" as a means of pursuing at the same time: *
* national emancipation from war-time defeat and post-war
restrict ions,
* support of their own economic growth after war-time
devastation,
* recovery of a say in international affairs in formal as well as 
in power terms,
* a new "regime"(60) of rules and codes of conduct to manage the 
growing interdependence,(61)
* a "working peace system" in a larger sense than just the
absence of war, including forms of peaceful, democratic and





























































































These partly overlapping functions of the Community
compatible, though not necessarily identical in the original
member countries - have largely been materialized - partly due to 
factors outside direct Community policies - partly due to 
different forms of integration.(62) The emancipation function has 
passed for most countries into a historical reminiscence; the 
establishment of a "working peace system" has been largely 
achieved; to maintain it is highly important, though from
national points of view no dramatic improvement of this system is 
needed.
For supporting economic growth - in the mid-eighties this 
means an increase in competitiveness and reduction of unemployment 
for keeping or re-establishing a regime for managed
interdependence (partly with new issues like ecology) and for 
maintaining or regaining a say in international affairs, European 
policies are still of major importance. In pursuing these goals 
through Community channels, however, the urge for major
institutional initiatives might be weaker.
For the "newcomers", most of the original functions - at 
least for those with different World War II experiences - were of 
no major importance. Thus, the passing of time and addition of 
new members led indeed to a new "generation" of politicians, for 




























































































role in the future development of their country, as they did for 
some of the "founding fathers".
This downgrading of the importance of the original functions 
is due not only to progress in integration; where major steps 
towards political union failed, like the European Defence 
Community or the Fouchet plans, other solutions, like NATO or 
European Political Cooperation, have fulfilled at least some of 
the original needs for the member countries. Failures to achieve 
more steps forward reinforced also the tendencies of the 
economically and politically "successful" West European States to 
reestablish and confirm themselves as major actors and 
consequently perceive concrete Community policies in narrower 
utilitarian terms of direct costs and benefits.(63) This reduced 
the propensity to make a larger investment into projects of the 
European Union as such and increased the propensity for package 
deals of an ever-increasing complexity and "technicality" (see 
also Thesis 1). The reluctance of new members to take bolder 
initiatives and the withering away of certain functions for the 
original members have led to the result that the institutional 
initiatives get a rather low priority on national agendas.
Piecemeal engineering with scope enlargement not 
substantially altering the institutional status quo will thus 




























































































follows that a core-area strategy might not benefit from too much 
drive from the original six member countries - or at least that 
simple analogies to the fifties might be treacherous.
********************************2.7********************************
The role national political systems play in modern welfare 
(service) states is strongly established and resists attempts at 
replacement or downgrading by an independent European system.
★  ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ■ i t
Since the post-war period, the EC member countries have 
developed into fully fledged welfare systems with party 
competition and increasing neocorporatism in which approximately 
half of the GNP is spent through governments (on different levels) 
and through public agencies (like social security etc.). National 
governments have become the central object of intensive lobbying 
for distribution and redistribution. They are made responsible 
for the "pursuit of happiness". Thus the whole national structure 
of policy-making has been oriented towards the national capital. 
It is no more so much national sovereignty in security and legal 
terms as such which gives the national political system its 
legitimacy, but the different "service functions" it performs for 
its citizens. Though the national government does not dispose of 
all the instruments necessary to fulfill these service functions 




























































































national frontiers), the citizens address their expectations and 
give their support primarily to the national system which he or 
she is familiar with.
The dilemma between the most efficient level of problem 
solving on one side (which, for many political issues, is the 
Community) and the established national political system - which 
evokes some traditional loyalities - is not likely to be solved in 
favour of pure problem rationality. The disposition of political 
forces in major Community countries to replace the role of the 
national system in these service functions to a large extent by a 
different, new and unfamiliar (European) system is low. The 
resistance of the whole political system to a large political 
change of functions is thus considerable.(64) Though the welfare 
state has and is suffering multiple crises, none of them has 
stirred up a broad political move towards more European 
integration.
The European Community and various cooperative policies were 
more a help for nation states in keeping and strengthening their 
salience than a sign of the nation state "withering away".(65) 
Major crises might undermine the legitimacy of a national system 
by "overloading" it and demonstrating its incapacity. Given a 
level of stability in the national political system, however, any 




























































































extension - not a downgrading - of the nation state. From this 
analysis, we would expect a constant scope enlargement. As to the 
institutional side, those systems are preferred which give 
political representatives of the national welfare state a decisive 
say. A presidential or a reinforced institutional model seems 
more adapted to this system than a dual model.
Divergences in the economic performance and the heterogeneity of 
economic policies have grown (or have at least not been 
considerably reduced), thus keeping the potential costs of giving 
up national control high.
With the help of the EC, the economic performance of all the 
original member countries has improved. The distance among them 
in some crucial terms, like international competitiveness, 
inflation rates, external balance, and regional equilibrium, 
however, has not really been bridged. With increasing membership, 
economic performance will further diverge in a Community of 
Twelve; We can expect a general interest in a common market and 
common internal and external economic policies, but there was and 
will be more controversy about the substance of these policies. 
Beside divergences in interests - due to different economic




























































































"philosophies" and instruments used for economic policies are 
still quite different, though perhaps less divergent in their real 
impact than might appear.
Looking at this situation, it can be assumed that 
institutional reforms towards a European Union by replacing or 
downgrading national instruments are not likely, since most member 
governments expect that new common policies run by independent 
bodies of the European Union will not as adequately suit their 
problems and philosophies as their national ones. Loss of formal 
control over instruments that are vital for national economies and 
crucial for winning national elections will not be easily 
accepted. Furthermore, as the CAP demonstrates, loss of one 
instrument is likely to be compensated by creation of others to 
fine-tune economic policies according to the needs perceived at 
the national level.
This thesis does not exclude that all member countries have a 
vital interest in pursuing Community policies, but this strong 
potential interest is restrained by the "uncalculable" risks of 
giving up the ultimate responsibility - even if national 
instruments have less impact than a genuine European policy.
In such situations, economic booms can facilitate the 




























































































treaties. If all economies grow, divergences are less 
embarrassing and the budget available to make side payments in 
favour of institutional steps is larger. In times of economic 
crisis, the costs of integration are more obvious and more 
painful, so the propensity for institutional reform is reduced.
If this thesis is valid, we would expect that if it is 
necessary to strengthen the institutional set-up those 
(intergovernmental) forms are preferred which leave the major 
influence to national governments. Such an analysis supports the 
utility of a multi-tier or a core area approach of "like-minded" 
countries of the same economic level.
b) The Community environment - restraints of a "cooperative 
federalism"
By a constant evolution of the institutional structure (though 
within clear limits) as well as by enlarging the scope of policies 
pursued by the Community, the Community institutions and related 
bodies have created an "acquis" which at the same time reduces on 
one side the options open and on the other side constantly creates 




























































































With the institutions created by the Paris and Rome treaties, 
with some reform of the original division of powers (especially 
establishing the budgetary powers of the EP), with institutional 
adaptations and amendments like Coreper and the European Council, 
with parallel developments like EPC and EMS, the structure of 
policy-making has gone through several evolutionary phases; 
historical plans are thus often outdated as experiences gained 
over the last three decades are building up their own "acquis"; 
the potential for institutional "pioneering" is reduced.
The scope of policies pursued in the Community and in related 
fora like EPC and the EMS have also increased considerably over 
the years. Most areas vital to national policies are in some way 
or other touched by Community deliberations, legislation and 
action; in this sense, national policies have been "Europeanized" 
however, the effectiveness by which these problems are tackled 
on the European level is generally assessed as inadequate - as 
most political forces are ready to agree.
The felt "disequilibria" of these policies and dynamic spill­
overs (not necessarily an "automatischer Sachzwang" a la 
Hallstein) push for more democratic and more efficient
institutional set-ups. The growing imperfections of the political 
system of the EC have increased the claim for institutional 




























































































insufficient policies are thus a constant source for new 
initiatives towards a European Union, though many forces which 
articulate the need for reform are at the same time corner-stones 
of the status quo.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *20* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Steps and strategies towards a European Union are not only 
influenced by the growing number of activities and the increased 
variety of institutional machinery but by the evolution of the 
Community into a system of "cooperative federalism",(67) 
increasing the "double role" of national decision-makers and 
reducing the field for manoeuvre of the EP.
By the term "cooperative federalism" we mean the "pooling" 
and "mixing" of national sovereignties with Community competences. 
In a system of cooperative federalism two levels (in our case the 
Community and the national) are not clearly separated in terms of 
their areas of action. By contrast, the traditional notion of 
federalism implies that each level operates on its own without 
taking into account the other level. In a cooperative federalist 
system, both levels share in the responsibility for problem 
solving. As neither has adequate legal competence and material 
instruments to tackle the challenges they face. This strong 




























































































federal states and in the Community) develops from the tasks of 
modern welfare states in an interdependent world. Thus, the 
evolution of the Community into a system of a cooperative 
federalism results from a dilemma. On one hand, governments see 
the need to enlarge the scope of Communities' activities to fulfil 
their service function better (see Theses 16 and 17); on the 
other hand, they are reluctant to give up control over their 
policies (see Theses 17 and 18).
The term "cooperative federalism" is used to mark - more 
clearly than other terms like "intergovernmentalization" or 
"regime" used to describe at least part of the same phenomena - 
the close links between several governmental levels and to put the 
analysis of the Community development into some comparative 
perspective. Strategies for a European Union thus must take into 
account not only the increased activities and the higher density 
of the institutional network but also this specific character of 
the Community system.
A major consequence of this process is a gain of power by the 
government (68) in all its major functions: policy determination, 
policy execution and policy control. At least in formal terms, 
parliaments are the losers; governments and bureaucracies are in 
a permanent process of "transnational" negotiation, the result of 




























































































Parliaments, without endangering the whole compromise.(69) The 
strengthening of administrative actors by the functional necessity 
of transnational cooperation on a permanent basis, however, does 
not lead to a "technocratic rule".(70) The administrative and 
political representatives of the Member States are part of "policy 
clusters" - policy networks which are formed by the close 
interaction of interested members of parliaments, the political 
leadership in government, interest groups, academics and the civil 
servants. The national positions being negotiated in Brussels are 
thus normally not just "bureaucratic" inventions by civil servants 
- "out of touch with the political reality in their country" - but 
reflect in most cases the consensus among the concerned national 
élites on certain topics (this analysis would explain the relative 
inertia of parliaments and parties referred to in Theses 4 and 5).
In such a system, the major national actors are becoming 
aware of their responsibilities for both levels. National 
decision-makers in the European Council and in the Council 
perceive the need to keep the Community system as such going, and 
not only when they are holding the Presidency; an output failure 
on the Community is clearly seen as having direct repercussions 
for the national service function.
The institutional system of the Community, as it has 




























































































stability and strength by the involvement of nearly all major 
national actors. The institutional build-up since the fifties is 
assembling nowadays nearly all decision-makers in regular 
intervals; the late-comers were the heads of government in the 
European Council. Deficits, however, exist in the parliamentary 
circles. Except for the European party associations, which are 
neither complete nor very relevant, parliamentary leaders outside 
the governments do not dispose of a regular European-wide network- 
this deficit has been reinforced by the nearly total reduction of 
dual mandate in the European Parliament. This loss of influence 
has not led to a strong revolt as many expected, partly, as 
explained above, because parlamentarians are integrated into 
informal policy networks in which they keep an ultimate veto power 
on national policies.
The intensive involvement of national decision-makers 
caused by and reinforcing at the same time the interdependence of 
the national and the Community levels - reduces the room for 
manoeuvre as the national systems control Community activities in 
nearly all phases.
In terms of institutional strategies for a European Union, we 
can conclude from these characteristics of the Community system 
that we are faced with a dilemma for our strategies: if we want




























































































countries, we need to base those steps on a majority of forces in 
parliaments, bureaucracies and interest groups who, however, 
basically support the present system of shared responsibilities 
and are, in institutional terms, mainly status quo oriented. 
Those forces are generally not interested in a structural reform 
which would reduce their influence and control over Community 
policies. On the other hand, if we want to achieve a step beyond 
the status quo, which seems necessary to solve the problems ahead 
in a rational and democratic way, we lack the political forces to 
give those steps enough weight.
c) The international environment - unity by external "coercion"?
*★ ***★ ★ ★ ★ ★ *★ ★ *★ ★ *★ ★ *★ *★ *★ ★ **★ ★ ★ ★ 21* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
The simple hypothesis that "the stronger the external challenges, 
the more easily steps towards a European Union are taken" can be 
regarded as refuted.
★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★
The history of the Community demonstrates that, in all steps 
and projects towards more institutional integration, the 
international environment played and plays a major though not 
persistent role (71) - not always leading towards faster agreement 
and more rapid implementation of initiatives. In times of crisis, 



























































































countries outside the Community. Those attempts are induced or 
strengthened by a "divide-et-impera" policy of third countries 
(like the Arab countries after the 4th Middle East war). For 
major institutional pushes the external challenges have not (yet?) 
proved strong enough. Furthermore, in times of crisis there is a 
reflex to fall back on known national systems or on partners you 
can trust - thus reinforcing Tendencies towards a "directoire" or 
a core area.
In the history of the Community, the international "power game" 
has usually offered a premium for a "European coalition". This 
premium was and is quite often offset by the fear of losing 
national freedom of action and by seme successes in a rather loose 
system of European cooperation.
~k 'k'kic’k'k'kic'k-fc'kic'k'k'k
The result of this trade-off between more say in 
international affairs on one hand and the reduction of formal 
sovereignity on the other hand is a double strategy of member 
countries leading towards "parallel Community activities"(72) in 
many sectors of international affairs. The member countries have 
common and coordinated forms of foreign economic (e.g. Lome) and 
diplomatic (UPC) policies at the same time that they retain their 



























































































not replaced but diversified. The collective strategic dependence 
on the USA has acted as a brake on development of closer unity in 
foreign policy and defence matters.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 2 3 * * * * * * * ' * * * * * ' * ' * ' * ' * * * * * ' * * * * * * * * * * * *
The economic interdependence of the European welfare systems has 
made cooperation imperative not only inside the Community but also 
outside in Western fora.
★ ★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★■A-****************************************
The need to bargain with partners like the USA, Japan and 
Third World countries has provided incentives for closer common 
action but did not prevent "direct" actions of member countries, 
for example in the IMF or in Western summitry. If Theses 21 to 22 
are valid, then neither the diplomatic/security position of Europe 
nor economic interdependence offer - at least at present- strong 
incentives for institutional reforms.
V. CONCLUSIONS - A CORE AREA STRATEGY AS SOLUTION OR 
RESIGNATION?
After this look into the past and the present, we need to 
look into the future at how far the conditions responsible for the 




























































































need to analyze how far new or reinforced challenges will lead to 
constructive packages breaking up the present institutional 
"impasse" in the system of "cooperative federalism".
Besides looking into the crystal ball, we could work with 
"scenarios" in which alternative evolutions in the national, 
Community and international environments are assembled.(73) Thus, 
if we expect a long-term economic recession, the propensity of the 
Community of Twelve either to collapse or wither away is high. 
Then different institutional models and different strategies 
should be pursued than in times of economic boom.
For the sake of our discussion, however, we assume that the 
theses presented above have a certain degree of validity for 
medium-term evolution of the status quo. From these analyses and 
assessments some suggestions for institutional strategies can be 
drawn.
***(1)★★★Package deals with scope enlargement and institutional 
reforms should not be planned in the medium term on only one "voie 
royale", e.g. certain institutional reforms or one crucial area of 
activities like the EMS or the "espace industrielle". Perceptions 
of the political leadership caused by political pressures might 
change in a short time. Various "locomotives" for integration 




























































































given moment, a rather simple "give and take relationship" with 
elements of institutional reforms in a crucial position should be 
presented.
***(2)***Package deals among all Member States which would enlarge 
scope and the institutional framework are difficult to identify in 
the present situation. The asterixes in the Dooge report are just 
an additional indicator that some countries are not prepared to 
offer concessions. In a Community of Ten or even Twelve some form 
of constructive compromises among countries on a different 
position in the international division of labour, of different 
degrees of European awareness and diverging conceptions for 
institutional reforms will make dynamic package deals with scope 
enlargement and strengthening of the institutional structure 
dif f icult.
Given this analysis of the missing preconditions ■ for 
institutional reforms, new forms of integration have been proposed 
in which the numbers of participants are limited. The above- 
mentioned strategies of l'Europe a la Carte,(74) differenzierte 
Integration,(75) "abgestufte Integration" (or l'Europe a plusieurs 
vitesses) a la Brandt and with variations a la Tindemans,(76) 
l'Europe a geornetrie variable,(7 7) the abgestufte Integration a la 
Grabitz(78) or a new "core group" being "threatened" as much by 




























































































Parliament (Art. 82) (and apparently attempted in part with the 
"revival" of the V.'EU), all start from the assumption that smaller 
circles of member countries will agree more readily on ambitious 
steps forward to solve problems in common. They differ about the 
forms by which the rest of the countries should "participate" in 
the common project or be led back into the "club" of advanced 
European circles. Stressing mainly the "scope enlarging" 
dimension, most of these concepts do not deal with the
implications for the institutional set up-of a European Union.
***(3)***As a strategy for reforming the existing institutions, 
those concepts could serve:
* as a means of keeping the status quo by allowing
institutional mechanisms which - like the "multiple
bilateralism" of Community countries (i.e. the regular 
bilateral meetings of some heads of governments) - might be 
outside the institutional orthodoxy but perhaps necessary to 
keep the institutional framework working;(79)
* to enlarge the scope outside the Community in a strict sense





























































































* to offer some kind of Community-oriented fallback position in 
case the overload on the Community institutions leads to a 
break-down.
***(4)***To use these concepts as a tactical element for a 
strategy towards a new institutional set-up, the dynamic 
governments must be prepared to go ahead alone.
The "tactical device" concept is based on the belief that 
reluctant countries will not want to stay outside an inner, more 
dynamic circle which they might have to join later under less 
favourable terms - as was Britain's experience after not entering 
the EEC club early enough. The inner core area must, however, be 
prepared to go ahead if the other countries call its bluff. Thus, 
the utility of these concepts as t act ical instruments will 
ultimately depend on their utility as a strategy.
***(5)***On the utility to a Community of Ten/Twelve of those 
concepts in achieving some kind of different institutional set up:
a) The slightly varying concepts of a multi-tier community as a 
"non-permanent exception but unlimited in time"(80) in which 
all countries agree on a common concept, some however 
delaying implementation for "objective" reasons (see e.g. 




























































































supported by the Community to reach the common standard, will 
not serve as a strategy for a major inst itutional drive 
towards a European Union. They might be useful for enlarging 
the scope of common activities, as happened with the EMS 
(though in that case the third element - that of special aid 
was not given to the non-implementing countries). Major 
institutional reforms would not garner even an agreement in 
principle by all members. Secondly, it is difficult to 
conceive of procedures in which some members would not - at 
least not actively - participate. The utility of "abgestufte 
Integration" as a strategy for institutional reforms in the 
direction of a European Union is therefore limited to an 
early stage of drawing new areas of activities into some kind 
of common (though imperfect) integration framework.
b) The strategy of "1'Europe a la Carte" - "that is common 
policies where there are common interests without any 
constraint on those who cannot join them"(81) - opens the 
possibility for a multiplicity of parallel approaches which - 
at least implicitly - defy any kind of coherent institutional 
framework. Scope enlargement without at least some kind of 
rules will not help institutional steps forward; they are a 
danger to existing institutions but do not offer 




























































































c) More promising is a strategy based on new (= old?) core 
areas. Institutional reforms and scope enlargement could be 
pursued in a coherent way. In a smaller circle of those with 
similar interests who are willing to go ahead with
integration, the subjective and objective preconditions are 
met to a higher degree than in other constellations. Refore 
jumping on this train, however, several warnings have to be 
raised:
A core area can only be implemented without major legal 
problems if the scope is limited to areas outside Community 
competences - e.g. security policies or a technology 
agency.(83) If countries want to establish an inner circle 
covering also policies which are within Community competences 
Art. 32 of the Draft Treaty does imply such a procedure - 
the constitutional problems of getting out of the existing 
Treaty obligations are immense. (84)
Furthermore: to create a package deal for a core area (see
Thesis 1) implies that there are enough interests which can 
be combined in a constructive way. The French/German 
understanding was seen as crucial for these packages (see 
Thesis 2). An analysis of interest constellations is, 
however, not too promising. Strong French interests for "new 




























































































et sociale, mercantilistic trade policies, more use of the 
ECU, espace sociale, prevention of German "neutralism")(85) 
are met with reluctance from the German side, whereas its 
major interests in an open world trading system, more common 
security and foreign environmental protection (acid rain)(86) 
might not meet the priorities of the French side.(87) In 
some areas, German interests converge more with British 
interests. On the institutional questions, as well, few 
constructive elements for a French/German package appear to 
exist. Some agreements for improving the efficiency of the 
existing Community might be possible. Although package deals 
are regularly put together by different priority sectors, 
some common starting points must be present as a locomotive. 
The Draft Treaty of the European Parliament includes some 
offers to all member countries but in the debate, so far, no 
"locomotive" of interests has been set in motion. In many 
areas of the Draft Treaty, French/German controversies may 
make agreement difficult.
From
t entat ively 
implemented
this analysis of interest constellations we can 
deduce that core-area strategies will not be easily 





























































































Even when deciding for a core-area strategy (though with the 
expectations that other will jump on the band wagon), relations 
with the rest of the Community countries must be put in some 
framework, as this is in the interest of all countries involved; 
thus, the room to manoeuvre for a core-area European Union, in 
terms of exclusive areas of activities and institutional autonomy, 
is limited.
Conclusion: The attractiveness of this strategy might be 
relatively high, but the probability of achieving a more 
democratic and mere efficient model by this route is low. The 
costs of the core-area strategy will, moreover, be high as the 
existing EC-framework will suffer from attempts in that direction. 
The strategy of reaching institutional progress towards European 
Union by a core-area approach should therefore be seen as a last 
resort.
At the end of this exercise in comparing different strategies 
in terms of their feasibility for reaching (different) 
institutional models, the results lead us to a certain 
resignation. The resistance to institutional change by the 
involved welfare systems is considered to be surmontable only by 
package deals which serve important interests affecting the 
political top of the Member States. Specific package deals of 




























































































However, preconditions regarding changes in this 
constellation are difficult to identify. The hope that 
perceptions of the political top about the necessity of 
institutional reforms (to deal effectively with the problems 
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